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Abstract
We consider a continuum percolation model consisting of two types of nodes, namely
legitimate and eavesdropper nodes, distributed according to independent Poisson point
processes (PPPs) in R2 of intensities λ and λE respectively. A directed edge from
one legitimate node A to another legitimate node B exists provided the strength of
the signal transmitted from node A that is received at node B is higher than that
received at any eavesdropper node. The strength of the received signal at a node from
a legitimate node depends not only on the distance between these nodes, but also on
the location of the other legitimate nodes and an interference suppression parameter
γ. The graph is said to percolate when there exists an infinite connected component.
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We show that for any finite intensity λE of eavesdropper nodes, there exists a critical
intensity λc < ∞ such that for all λ > λc the graph percolates for sufficiently small
values of the interference parameter. Furthermore, for the sub-critical regime, we
show that there exists a λ0 such that for all λ < λ0 ≤ λc a suitable graph defined over
eavesdropper node connections percolates that precludes percolation in the graphs
formed by the legitimate nodes.
1. Introduction and main results
Random geometric graphs have been used extensively to study various properties
of wireless communication networks. The nodes of the graph represent the com-
municating entities that are assumed to be distributed randomly in space, and the
edges/connections between nodes reflect the realistic wireless communication links.
With the simplest connection model, two nodes are connected (or have an edge be-
tween them) provided they are within a specified cutoff distance from each other [6,7].
Another connection model of interest is the protocol model [4], that incorporates
interference emanating from simultaneous transmission by multiple nodes, where two
nodes are connected if there is no other node in a specified cut-off area (guard-zone)
around the two nodes. Thus a smaller cutoff area results in greater spatial reuse,
or more nodes being able to communicate simultaneously. A non guard zone based
connection model for wireless communication is the threshold model [4], where two
nodes are connected if the signal-to-noise-ratio (SINR) between them is more than a
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threshold. The SINR measures the strength of the signal received from a particular
node relative to those received from other nodes, and SINR between nodesXi and Xj
is defined as
SINRij =
Pℓ(Xi,Xj)
N + γ
∑
k 6=i,j Pℓ(Xk,Xj)
where P is the transmitted power from each node, ℓ(Xi,Xj) ≤ 1 is the path-loss or
attenuation factor, N > 0 is the environment noise, and γ ≥ 0 is the interference
suppression parameter.
Existence of a path between two nodes in the graph implies the ability of those
nodes to communicate via a multi-hop path. Consequently, percolation in the graph
corresponds to long range connectivity among large number of nodes that are part of
the giant component. Assuming that the nodes are distributed according to a Poisson
point process in R2 of intensity λ, existence of percolation in the graph with the SINR
threshold connection model was shown in [1, 2] for all sufficiently small γ > 0.
Of recent interest is the problem of percolation in wireless networks in the presence
of eavesdroppers [5,8,9]. In these models, referred to as the information theoretic se-
cure models, a legitimate node i is connected (has an edge) to node j provided node j
is closer to node i than its nearest eavesdropper. These are the links over which secure
communication can take place in the presence of eavesdroppers of arbitrary capability.
Assuming that the legitimate and eavesdropper nodes are distributed according to
independent Poisson point processes in R2 of intensities λ, and λE , respectively,
existence of phase transition of percolation in these graphs was established in [5,8,9].
Using a branching process argument [5, 9] show that if the ratio λ/λE < 1, then
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almost surely, no unbounded connected component exits.
The above secrecy graph model [5, 8, 9] assumes that the signals transmitted from
different legitimate nodes do not interfere with each other. In reality, that is difficult to
incorporate, since there are large number of legitimate nodes, and all cannot transmit
on orthogonal frequency or time slots. To generalize the secrecy graph model, we
extend the notion of the secrecy graph using the SINR or threshold model, where two
legitimate nodes are connected if the SINR between them is more than the SINR at
any other eavesdropper node. We derive two results on the percolation properties for
this new SINR based secrecy graph model. The first result is similar in spirit to the
one derived by [2] . It states that for any given intensity λE of the eavesdropper nodes,
the secrecy graph percolates for sufficiently large intensity λ of legitimate nodes and
all sufficiently small interference suppression parameter γ. The second result is that
for a given λE and γ > 0, if the density of legitimate nodes is below a threshold, then
the graph does not percolate. To prove the second result, we use a novel technique
of defining a suitable graph over eavesdropper node connections, where percolation
in the eavesdropper nodes’ graph precludes percolation in the graphs formed by the
legitimate nodes. To complete the result we show that for any given λE and γ > 0,
if the density of legitimate nodes is below a threshold, then the defined eavesdropper
nodes’ graph percolates.
Before we proceed to describe the model in detail and state the main results, we
need some notation.
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Notation: The cardinality of set S is denoted by |S|. The complement of set S is
denoted by S¯. A ball of radius r centered at x is denoted by B(x, r). The boundary
of a set G ⊂ R2 is denoted by δG. For a set A ⊂ R2, a+ A denotes a translation of
A with a ∈ R2 as the center. The Lebesgue measure of a set A ⊂ R2 is denoted as
ν(A).
1.1. System Model
We now describe the secure SINR graph (SSG), which generalizes the secrecy
graph considered in [5, 8, 9], by allowing all legitimate nodes to transmit at the same
time/frequency and interfere with each other’s communication. Let Φ be the set of
legitimate nodes, and ΦE be the set of eavesdropper nodes. We assume that the
points in Φ and ΦE are distributed according to independent PPPs with intensities
λ and λE , respectively. Let xi, xj ∈ Φ, and e ∈ ΦE . Without loss of generality, we
assume an average power constraint of unity (P = 1) at each node in Φ, and noise
variance N = 1. Let 0 < γ ≤ 1 be the processing gain of the system (interference
suppression parameter), which depends on the orthogonality between codes used by
different legitimate nodes during simultaneous transmissions. Then the SINR between
xi and xj is
SINRij :=
ℓ(xi, xj)
γ
∑
k∈Φk 6=i ℓ(xk, xj) + 1
,
and between xi and e is
SINRie :=
ℓ(xi, e)∑
k∈Φk 6=i ℓ(xk, xj) + 1
.
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Note that the parameter γ is absent in the second SINR formula. This is due to the fact
that the code used by the legitimate nodes is not known to the eavesdroppers, hence
no processing gain can be obtained at any of the eavesdroppers. Then the maximum
rate of reliable communication between xi and xj such that an eavesdropper e gets no
knowledge is [11]
RSINRij (e) := [log2 (1 + SINRij)− log2 (1 + SINRie)]+ ,
and the maximum rate of communication between xi and xj that is secured from all
the eavesdropper nodes of ΦE ,
RSINRij := min
e∈ΦE
Rij(e).
Definition 1.1. SINR Secrecy graph (SSG) is a directed graph SSG(θ) := {Φ, E},
with vertex set Φ, and edge set E := {(xi, xj) : RSINRij > θ}, where θ is the minimum
rate of secure communication required between any two nodes of Φ.
We will assume θ = 0 for the rest of the paper, and represent SSG(0) as SSG. The
results can be generalized easily for θ > 0. With θ = 0, SSG := {Φ, E}, with edge
set E := {(xi, xj) : SINRij > SINRie, ∀ e ∈ ΦE}.
Definition 1.2. We define that a node xi can connect to xj (or there is a link/connection
between them) if (xi, xj) ∈ SSG.
Definition 1.3. We define that there is a path from node xi ∈ Φ to xj ∈ Φ if there
is a connected path from xi to xj in the SSG. A path between xi and xj on SSG is
represented as xi → xj .
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Definition 1.4. The connected component of any node xj ∈ Φ, is defined as Cxj :=
{xk ∈ Φ, xj → xk}, with cardinality |Cxj |.
Remark 1.1. Note that because of stationarity of the PPP, the distribution of |Cxj |
does not depend on j, and hence without loss of generality from here on we consider
node x1 for the purposes of defining connected components. Further we assume
without loss of generality that x1 is at the origin.
In this paper we are interested in studying the percolation properties of the SSG.
In particular, we are interested in finding the minimum value λc of λ for which the
probability of having an unbounded connected component in SSG is greater than
zero, as a function of λE , i.e. λc := inf{λ : P (|Cx1 | = ∞) > 0}. The event
{|Cx1 | = ∞} is also referred to as percolation on SSG, and we say that percolation
happens if P ({|Cx1 | =∞}) > 0, and does not happen if P ({|Cx1 | =∞}) = 0.
Remark 1.2. Assuming that all legitimate nodes can transmit in orthogonal time/frequency
slots, secrecy graph SG was introduced in [5], where two legitimate nodes are con-
nected if the received signal power between them is more than the received signal
power at the nearest eavesdropper, i.e. SG := {Φ, E}, with vertex set Φ, and edge
set E := {(xi, xj) : ℓ(xi, xj) > ℓ(xi, e), ∀ e ∈ ΦE}. Percolation properties of
SG were studied in [8, 9], where in [9] it was shown that if λ < λE , then there is
no percolation, while [8] showed the existence of λ for any fixed λE for which the
SG percolates. The graph structure of SSG is more complicated compared to SG
because of the presence of interference power terms corresponding to simultaneously
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transmitting legitimate nodes, and hence the results of [8, 9] do not apply for SSG.
For example, consider the case of γ = 0, where it is possible that two legitimate nodes
xi and xj , with dij > mine∈ΦE die can connect to each other in the SSG, however, xi
and xj cannot connect to each other in the SG since dij > mine∈ΦE die. Similarly, if
xj is closer to xi than any other eavesdropper node, then xi is connected to xj in SG,
however, that may not be the case in SSG.
Remark 1.3. Without the presence of eavesdropper nodes, percolation on the SINR
graph, where the vertex set is Φ, and edge set E := {(xi, xj) : SINRij ≥ β, xi, xj ∈
Φ} for some fixed threshold β, has been studied in [1, 2, 10]. The results of [1, 2, 10],
however, do not apply for the SSG, since for SSG, β = SINRie is a random variable
that depends on both Φ and ΦE .
Remark 1.4. Note that we have defined SSG to be a directed graph, and the con-
nected component of x1 is its out-component, i.e. the set of nodes with which x1 can
communicate secretly. Since xi → xj, xi, xj ∈ Φ, does not imply xj → xi xi, xj ∈
Φ, one can similarly define in-component Cinxj := {xk ∈ Φ, xk → xj}, bi-directional
component Cbdxj := {xk ∈ Φ, xj → xk and xk → xj}, and either one-directional
component Cedxj := {xk ∈ Φ, xj → xk or xk → xj}. Percolation on Cinxj , Cbdxj and
Cedxj is in principle similar to the percolation on out-component, but are not considered
in this paper.
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1.2. Main Results
Theorem 1.1. For the signal attenuation function ℓ(x), such that ∫ xℓ(x)dx < ∞,
for any λE , there exists λ′ < ∞ and a function γ′(λ, λE) > 0, such that P (|Cx1 | =
∞) > 0 in the SSG for λ > λ′, and γ < γ′(λ, λE).
We show that for small enough γ, there exists a large enough λ for which the SSG
percolates with positive probability for any value of λE . This result is similar in spirit
to [1, 2], where percolation is shown to happen in the SINR graph, where two nodes
are connected if the SINR between them is more than a fixed threshold β, (without the
secrecy constraint due to eavesdroppers) for small enough γ with finite and unbounded
support signal attenuation function, respectively. The major difference between the
SSG and SINR graph, is that with SSG the threshold for connection between two
nodes (maximum of SINRs received at all eavesdroppers) is a random variable that
depends on both the legitimate and eavesdropper density, in contrast the threshold in
the SINR graph is a fixed constant.
To prove the result, we consider percolation on another graph SSGe that is a subset
of SSG. SSGe is obtained from SSG by replacing the SINR at each eavesdropper
node in SSG definition by SINRie = ℓ(die), i.e. the SINR at each eavesdropper node
is replaced by just the signal power received at the eavesdropper node and making the
interference power terms equal to zero. Considering this subset SSGe simplifies the
percolation analysis significantly. Then to show the percolation on the subset SSGe,
we map the continuum percolation of SSG to an appropriate bond percolation on the
square lattice, similar to [2].
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For the converse, we have the following Theorem on the lower bound for the critical
density λc.
Theorem 1.2. For every λE > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a λc = λc(λE , γ) > 0
such that for all λ < λc, P (|Cx1 | =∞) = 0 in the SSG.
We show that for any γ > 0, there exists small enough λ for which the SSG does
not percolate for any value of λE . In prior work, on secrecy graph with no interference
among simultaneously transmitting legitimate nodes, a stronger result was proved that
if λ < λE then the secrecy graph does not percolate [9] using branching process
argument on the out-degree distribution. We are only able to show an existential result
for the SSG, since finding the out-degree distribution of any node in the SSG is quite
challenging and SSG is not amenable to analysis similar to [9].
The proof idea is to define an appropriate eavesdropper node graph such that if an
edge exists between two eavesdropper nodes then there exists no edge of SSG that
crosses that edge in R2. Note that for SSG to percolate, there should be left to right
crossing and top to bottom crossing of any square box of large size in R2 by connected
edges of SSG. However, if the eavesdropper node graph percolates, then there cannot
be left to right crossing and top to bottom crossing of any square box of large size
in R2 by connected edges of SSG, and consequently SSG cannot percolate if the
eavesdropper node graph percolates. Then we derive conditions for percolation on the
defined eavesdropper node graph to find conditions when the SSG does not percolate.
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2. Proof of Theorem 1.1
In this section we are interested in the super-critical regime and want to find an
upper bound on λ such that P (|Cx1 | = ∞) > 0 for a fixed λE . Towards that end, we
will tie up the percolation on SSG to a bond percolation on square lattice, and show
that bond percolation on the square lattice implies percolation in the SSG.
For the super-critical regime, we consider the enhanced graphSSGe, whereSSGe :=
{Φ, Ee}, with edge set Ee := {(xi, xj) : SINRij > ℓ(die), ∀ e ∈ ΦE}. For defining
SSGe, we have considered the interference power at the eavesdropper nodes to be
zero. Clearly, SSGe ⊆ SSG, and hence if SSGe percolates, then so does SSG.
We tile R2 into a square lattice S with side s. Let S′ = S+( s2 ,
s
2) be the dual lattice
of S obtained by translating each edge of S by ( s2 ,
s
2 ). For any edge a of S, let S1(a)
and S2(a) be the two adjacent squares to a. See Fig. 1 for a pictorial description.
Let {ai}4i=1 denote the four vertices of the rectangle S1(a) ∪ S2(a). Let Y (a) be the
smallest square containing ∪4i=1B(ai, t), where t is such that ℓ(t) < ℓ(
√
5s)
2 .
Definition 2.1. Any edge a of S is defined to be open if
1. there is at least one node of Φ in both the adjacent squares S1(a) and S2(a),
2. there are no eavesdropper nodes in Y (a),
3. and for any legitimate node xi ∈ Φ∩ (S1(a) ∪ S2(a)), the interference received
at any legitimate node xj ∈ Φ ∩ (S1(a) ∪ S2(a)), Iij :=
∑
k∈Φ,k 6=i ℓ(xk, xj) ≤
1
γ .
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An open edge is pictorially described in Fig. 1 by edge a, where the black dots
represent a legitimate node while a cross represents an eavesdropper node.
The next Lemma allows us to tie up the continuum percolation on SSG to the bond
percolation on the square lattice, where we show that if an edge a is open, then all
legitimate nodes lying in S1(a) ∪ S2(a) can connect to each other.
Lemma 1. If an edge a of S is open, then any node xi ∈ Φ ∩ (S1(a) ∪ S2(a)) can
connect to any node xj ∈ Φ ∩ (S1(a) ∪ S2(a)) in SSGe.
Proof: For any xi, xj ∈ Φ ∩ (S1(a) ∪ S2(a)), SINRij ≥ ℓ(
√
5s)
2 , since I
i
j :=∑
k∈Φ,k 6=i ℓ(xk, xj) ≤ 1γ for each xi, xj ∈ Φ∩(S1(a) ∪ S2(a)). Moreover, since there
are no eavesdropper nodes in Y (a), the minimum distance between any eavesdropper
node from any legitimate node in Φ ∩ (S1(a) ∪ S2(a)) is at least t. Since t is such
that ℓ(t) < ℓ(
√
5s)
2 , clearly, xi, xj ∈ Φ ∩ (S1(a) ∪ S2(a)) are connected in SSGe.
Definition 2.2. An open component of S is the sequence of connected open edges of
S.
Definition 2.3. A circuit in S or S′ is a connected path of S or S′ which starts and
ends at the same point. A circuit in S or S′ is defined to be open/closed if all the edges
on the circuit are open/closed in S or S′.
Some important properties of S and S′ which are immediate are as follows.
Lemma 2. If the cardinality of the open component of S containing the origin is
infinite, then |Cx1 | =∞.
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Proof: Follows from Lemma 1.
Y (a)
S2(a)S1(a)
t
s a
FIGURE 1: Open edge definition on a square lattice for super-critical regime.
Lemma 3. [3] The open component of S containing the origin is finite if and only if
there is a closed circuit in S′ surrounding the origin.
Hence, if we can show that the probability that there exists a closed circuit in S′
surrounding the origin is less than one, then it follows that an unbounded connected
component exists in S with non-zero probability. Moreover, having an unbounded
connected component in the square lattice S implies that there is an unbounded con-
nected component in SSG from Lemma 1. Next, we find a bound on λ as a function
of λE such that probability of having a closed circuit in S′ surrounding the origin
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is less than one. This is a standard approach used for establishing the existence of
percolation in discrete graphs.
For an edge a, let A(a) = 1 if Φ ∩ Si(a) 6= ∅, i = 1, 2, and zero otherwise.
Similarly, let B(a) = 1 (= 0) if Iij :=
∑
k∈Φ,k 6=i ℓ(xk, xj) ≤ 1γ for xi, xj ∈
Φ ∩ (S1(a) ∪ S2(a)) (otherwise), and C(a) = 1 (= 0) if there are no eavesdrop-
per nodes in Y (a) (otherwise). Then by definition, the edge a is open if D(a) =
A(a)B(a)C(a) = 1.
Now we want to bound the probability of having a closed circuit surrounding the
origin in S. Towards that end, we will first bound the probability of a closed circuit
of length n, i.e. P (D(a1) = 0,D(a2) = 0, . . . ,D(an) = 0), ∀ n ∈ N considering
n distinct edges. Let pA := P (A(ai) = 0) for any i. Since Φ is a PPP with density
λ, pA = 1− (1 − e−λs2)2. Then we have the following intermediate results to upper
bound P (D(a1) = 0,D(a2) = 0, . . . ,D(an) = 0).
Lemma 4. P (A(a1) = 0, A(a2) = 0, . . . , A(an) = 0) ≤ pn1 , where p1 := p1/4A .
Proof: Follows from the fact that in any sequence of n edges of S there are at least
n/4 edges such that their adjacent squares S1(ae)∪S2(ae) do not overlap. Therefore
P (A(a1) = 0, A(a2) = 0, . . . , A(an) = 0) ≤ P (∩e∈OA(ae) = 0), where O is the
set of edges for which their adjacent squares S1(ae) ∪ S2(ae) have no overlap, and
|O| = n/4. Since S1(ae) ∪ S2(ae), e ∈ O have no overlap, and events A(ae) = 0
are independent for ae ∈ O, the result follows.
Lemma 5. [2, Proposition 2] For ∫∞0 xℓ(x)dx < ∞, P (B(a1) = 0, B(a2) =
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0, . . . , B(an) = 0) ≤ pn2 , where p2 := e
(
2λ
K
∫
ℓ(x)dx− 1
γK
)
, and K is a constant.
Lemma 6. P (C(a1) = 0, C(a2) = 0, . . . , C(an) = 0) ≤ pn3 , for some p3 indepen-
dent of n.
Proof: By definition, eventsC(ai) and C(aj) are independent if Y (ai)∩Y (aj) = φ.
Consider a circuit Pn in S of length n, with a subset Psn ⊂ Pn, where Psn = {ai}i∈I ,
where for any n,m ∈ I, Y (an) ∩ Y (am) = φ. Since Y (a) occupies at most(
L+
⌈
2t
s
⌉) × (L+ 1 + ⌈2ts ⌉) squares of lattice S, where L = 2 ⌈√5⌉, it follows
that |I| ≥ nψ , where ψ = 8
(
L+
⌈
2t
s
⌉)2 − 1. Thus, P (C(a1) = 0, C(a2) =
0, . . . , C(an) = 0) ≤ pn3 , where p3 = P (C(ai) = 0)
1
ψ and P (C(ai) = 0) =
e−λEν(Y (ai)).
Lemma 7. P (D(a1) = 0,D(a2) = 0, . . . ,D(an) = 0) ≤ (√p1 + p21/4 + p31/4)n.
Proof: Follows from [2, Proposition 3], where event D(a) = 1 if A(a)B(a)C(a) =
1.
Let q := (√p1 + p21/4 + p31/4). The next Lemma characterizes an upper bound on q
for which the probability of having a closed circuit in S surrounding the origin is less
than one.
Lemma 8. If q < 11−2
√
10
27 , then the probability of having a closed circuit in S′
surrounding the origin is less than one.
Proof: For any circuit of length n, there are 4 possible choices of edges for the
starting step and thereafter 3 choices for every step, except for last step which is
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fixed given the rest of choice of edges since the circuit has to terminate at the starting
point. Moreover, for a circuit containing the origin, the maximum possible distinct
intersections with the x-axis are n. Thus, the number of possible circuits of length n
around the origin is less than or equal to 4n3n−2. From Lemma 7, we know that the
probability of a closed circuit of length n is upper bounded by qn. Thus,
P (closed circuit around origin) ≤
∞∑
n=1
4n3n−2qn,
=
4q
3(1 − 3q)2 ,
which is less than 1 for q < 11−2
√
10
27 .
Proof of Theorem 1.1. Following Lemmas 3 and 8, it suffices to show that q can be
made arbitrarily small for an appropriate choice of parameters. For any eavesdropper
density λE , p3 can be made arbitrarily small by choosing small enough s and t.
Depending on the choice of s, p1 can be made arbitrarily small for large enough
legitimate node density λ, and finally depending on the choice of λ, choosing small
enough γ, p2 can be made arbitrarily small. ✷
3. Proof of Theorem 1.2
In this section, we are interested in the sub-critical regime of percolation, i.e.
obtaining a lower bound on λc as a function of λE for which percolation does not
happen. We consider the case of γ = 0, where xi and xj are connected in the SSG if
ℓ(dij) <
(
ℓ(xi, e)
1 +
∑
xj∈Φ,j 6=i ℓ(xj, e)
)
, ∀ e ∈ ΦE.
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If we can show that λc > λ0 for γ = 0, then since SSG with γ > 0 is contained in
SSG with γ = 0, we have that for all γ > 0, λc > λ0. So the lower bound λ0 for
λc obtained with γ = 0 serves as a universal lower bound on the critical density λc
required for percolation. Let the interference power received at any eavesdropper with
respect to signal from xk is Ike :=
∑
xj∈Φ,j 6=k ℓ(xj, e).
For the case of γ = 0, we proceed as follows. We tile R2 into a square lattice M
with side M . Let M′ = M+(M2 ,
M
2 ) be the dual lattice of M obtained by translating
each edge of M by (M2 ,
M
2 ). For any edge e of M, let S1(e) and S2(e) be the two
adjacent squares to e. See Fig. 2 for a pictorial description. Let T1(e) and T2(e)
be the smaller squares of side m contained inside S1(e) and S2(e), respectively, as
shown in Fig. 2, with centers identical to that of S1 and S2.
Definition 3.1. For any edge e of M, we define three indicator variables A˜(e), B˜(e),
and C˜(e) as follows.
1. A˜(e) = 1 if there is at least one eavesdropper node of ΦE in both the adjacent
squares T1(e) and T2(e).
2. B˜(e) = 1 if there are no legitimate nodes in S1(e) and S2(e).
3. C˜(e) = 1 if for any eavesdropper node e ∈ ΦE ∩ (T1(e) ∪ T2(e)), the interfer-
ence received from all the legitimate nodes Ie :=
∑
xk∈Φ ℓ(xk, e) ≤ c.
Then an edge e is defined to be open if D˜(e) = A˜(e)B˜(e)C˜(e) = 1. An open edge
is pictorially described in Fig. 2 by a blue edge e, where the black dots represent
legitimate nodes while crosses are used to represent eavesdropper nodes.
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em
M
m
M
T1(e) T2(e)
S1(e) S2(e)
FIGURE 2: Open edge definition on a square lattice for sub-critical regime.
Lemma 9. For any m and c, for large enough M , an edge (xi, xj) ∈ SSG cannot
cross an open edge e of M.
Proof: Let two legitimate nodes xi, xj ∈ Φ be such that the straight line between xi
and xj intersects an open edge e of M. Then by definition of an open edge, xi, xj /∈
(S1(e) ∪ S2(e)). Thus, the signal power between xi and xj , is ℓ(dij), dij > M .
Moreover, the SINR between xi and any eavesdropper node e ∈ (T1(e) ∪ T2(e)),
SINRie ≥ ℓ(die)1+c , since edge e is open and hence Ie ≤ c for any e ∈ (T1(e) ∪
T2(e). Thus, choosing M large enough, we can have ℓ(dij) < SINRie for any
e ∈ (T1(e) ∪ T2(e)), and hence xi and xj cannot be connected directly in SSG if
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the straight line between them happens to cross an open edge e of M.
Definition 3.2. Consider a square box B. Then by {L → R crossing of B by G},
we mean that there is a connected path of graph G that crosses B from left to right.
Similarly, top to bottom crossing is represented as {T → D crossing of B by G}.
Lemma 10. If bond percolation happens on square lattice M for large enoughM for
which an edge (xi, xj) ∈ SSG cannot cross an open edge e of M, then the connected
component of SSG is finite.
Proof: Consider a square box BN of side N centered at the origin. Let M be large
enough such that an edge (xi, xj) ∈ SSG cannot cross an open edge e of M. If bond
percolation happens on square lattice M, then
lim
N→∞
P (∃ a L→ R and T → D crossing of BN by open edges of M) = 1. (1)
The proof is by contradiction. Let there be an infinite connected component in the
SSG with probability 1. Then, necessarily
lim
N→∞
P (∃ a L→ R and T → D crossing of BN by SSG) = 1. (2)
Since M is such that an edge (xi, xj) ∈ SSG cannot cross an open edge e of M, (1)
and (2) cannot hold simultaneously.
Next, we show that for small enough density of legitimate nodes λ, bond per-
colation can happen on a square lattice M for large enough M for which an edge
(xi, xj) ∈ SSG cannot cross an open edge e of M.
Theorem 3.1. For large enough M that ensures that (xi, xj) ∈ SSG cannot cross
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an open edge e of M, bond percolation on M happens for small enough density of
legitimate nodes λ.
Proof: Similar to the proof in the super-critical regime, we need to show that the
probability of having a closed circuit surrounding the origin in M is less than 1.
Towards that end, consider the probability of a closed circuit of length n, P (D˜(e1) =
0, D˜(e2) = 0, . . . , D˜(en) = 0), where D˜(e1) = A˜(e1)B˜(e1)C˜(e1). Similar to
Lemma 4, P (A˜(e1) = 0, A˜(e2) = 0, . . . , A˜(en) = 0) ≤ rn1 , where r1 := r1/4A and
rA = 1− (1− e−λEm)2 is the probability that there is no eavesdropper in either T1(e)
or T2(e). Similarly, following Lemma 4, P (B˜(e1) = 0, B˜(e2) = 0, . . . , B˜(en) =
0) ≤ rn2 , where r2 := r1/4B and rB = 1−e−2λM
2 is the probability that there is at least
one legitimate node of Φ in S1(e) or S2(e), P (C˜(e1) = 0, C˜(e2) = 0, . . . , C˜(en) =
0) ≤ rn3 where r3 =:= e(
2λ
K
∫
ℓ(x)dx− c
K
) following Lemma 5, and finally P (D˜(e1) =
0, D˜(e2) = 0, . . . , D˜(en) = 0) ≤
(√
r1 + r
1/4
2 + r
1/4
3
)n
following Lemma 7. Let
rs :=
√
r1 + r
1/4
2 + r
1/4
3 .
Using Peierl’s argument, bond percolation happens in M if rs < ǫ for sufficiently
small ǫ > 0. Let us fix such an ǫ > 0. Then, by choosing m large enough, we can
have √r1 < ǫ3 . Moreover, for fixed c, let M be large enough such that for any pair of
legitimate nodes xi, xj /∈ (S1(e) ∪ S2(e)) for which the straight line between them
intersects an open edge e of M, ℓ(dij) < SINRie for any e ∈ (T1(e) ∪ T2(e)). Now,
given c,m, and M , we can choose λ small enough so that r1/42 < ǫ3 and r
1/4
2 <
ǫ
3 .
Thus, we have that rs < ǫ as required for an appropriate choice of m,M and λ.
Thus, from Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 10, we have that for small enough legitimate
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node density λ, SSG with γ = 0 does not percolate.
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